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Live	&	Online
September	23,	2016
This 14th Annual OsgoodePD one 
day  intensive program on the law 
of Search and Seizure in Canada 
will give you the latest and most 
important developments. You will get practical tactics and 
information you can use from prominent experts.
14th Annual National Symposium on Search & Seizure Law in Canada 
 Search
Search warrants are powerful tools that can make or break a case. Recent
court decisions continue to make apparent the importance of clear, accurate
and complete Search Warrant Applications and the consequences of deficient
drafting.
Whether you’re a Crown Attorney, Law Enforcement Officer, Judge, Justice of
the Peace, Government Regulator or Defence Lawyer, it is imperative that you
understand the thinking behind search warrants, know how to properly write
or attack them, and are able to avoid the many pitfalls and problems they
raise.
This comprehensive Osgoode Professional Development program is designed
especially to provide you with the knowledge and skills you need to draft a wide
variety of search warrants with clarity and certainty, to review and revise warrants,
and to identify and develop strategies for defending/attacking the search
warrant in court.
You’ll hear from a faculty of Canada’s top Crown and defence litigators and
experienced police officers on:
• Identifying issues
• Writing to the section
• Computer searches - unique and critical drafting issues
• How to analyze and draft outlines for complex fact patterns
• Warrant execution issues, Telewarrants, Impression Warrants, Tracking Device
Warrants and other and Specialized Warrants
• Using anonymous sources
• Affiant testimony - tips, traps and techniques
The Optional Workshop (for Day One registrants only) is designed to build on the
learning in the first day of the course. You’ll draft and review portions of a warrant
based on a crime fact scenario (Note: advanced preparation is required).
This course fills up quickly. Timely registration is recommended.
 
Chairs
Scott C. Hutchison, Stockwoods LLP 
Fraser M. Kelly, General Counsel, London Crown Attorney’s Office, Ministry of the
Attorney General (Ontario)
OPD Program Lawyer
Mary Park
mpark@osgoode.yorku.ca
 
 
 DATE AND LOCATION
March 21, 2013
9:00 a.m. - 4:30 p.m. EDT/EST
Distance Learning Avaialble
Webcasting Requirements
 
Optional Workshop
Friday, March 22, 2013
9:00 a.m. - 1:00 p.m.
 
 
Osgoode Professional
Development Centre
1 Dundas St. W., 26th Floor
Toronto, ON
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University
1 Dundas Street West, Suite 2602, Toronto, ON Canada M5G 1Z3
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WHAT’S	NEW	FOR	POLICE	IN	
THE	LIBRARY
The Justice Institute of British Columbia Library is an 
excellent resource for learning. Here is a list of its 
recent acquisitions which may be of interest to 
police. 
Bullies:  from the playground to the boardroom: 
strategies for survival.
Jane Middelton-Moz & Mary Lee Zawadski.
Deerfield Beach, FL: Health Communications, 2014.
BF 637 B85 M53 2014
Designing  adaptive and personalized learning 
environments.
Kinshuk.
New York, NY: Routledge, 2016.
LB 1031 K415 2016
Effective succession planning:  ensuring  leadership 
continuity and building talent from within.
William J. Rothwell.
New York, NY: Amacom, 2016.
HD 57.7 R689 2016
Everyday encounters:  an introduction to 
interpersonal communication.
Julia Wood & Ann Schweitzer.
Toronto, ON: Nelson Education Ltd., 2016.
BF 637 C45 W656 2016
Future crimes: inside the digital underground and 
the battle for our connected world.
Marc Goodman.
Toronto, ON: Anchor Canada, 2016.
HV 6773 G65 2016
The happiness equation:  want nothing  + do 
anything = have everything.
Neil Pasricha.
New York, NY: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 2016.
BJ 1481 P38 2016
The happiness track: how to apply the science of 
happiness to accelerate your success.
Emma Seppälä.
London: Piatkus, 2016.
BF 637 S8 S426 2016
Managing  conflict at work: understanding  and 
resolving  conflict for productive working 
relationships.
Clive Johnson & Jackie Keddy.
London: Philadelphia : Kogan Page, 2010.
HD 42 J643 2010
Mastering  coaching:  practical insights for 
developing high performance .
Max Landsberg.
London: Profile Books, 2015.
HF 5549.5 C53 L36 2015
Nonviolent communication: a language of life.
Marshall B. Rosenberg.
Encinitas, CA : PuddleDancer Press, 2015.
BF 637 C45 R67 2015
The organized mind: thinking  straight in the age 
of information overload
Daniel J. Levitin.
Toronto, ON: Allen Lane, 2014.
BF 444 L49 2014
Riding  the waves of culture: understanding 
diversity in global business.
Fons Trompenaars & Charles Hampden-Turner.
New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 2012.
HF 5549.5 M5 T76 2012
Talking  to crazy:  how to deal with the irrational 
and impossible people in your life.
Mark Goulston.
New York, NY: AMA, 2015.
BF 637 I48 G68 2015
What great trainers do: the ultimate guide to 
delivering engaging and effective learning.
Robert Bolton & Dorothy Grover Bolton.
New York, NY: AMA, 2016.
HF 5549.5 T7 B5785 2016 
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NO	EXCEPTION	TO	IMPLIED	
LICENCE	FOR	IMPAIRED	
DRIVING	CASES
R. v. Rogers, 2016 SKCA 105
After observing  a man back  into a car, 
a witness called police and reported a 
suspected impai red dr iver. He 
provided the  driver’s description, and 
the make, model and licence plate 
number of the  car. A police officer was dispatched to 
the registered owner’s apartment. The officer entered 
an unlocked exterior door to the apartment building, 
went to the accused’s door and knocked. The 
accused opened the door and spoke with the officer. 
Both men remained on either side of the door jam. 
The officer formed the opinion that the accused was 
impaired. His speech was “very slurred”. When 
asked whether he had been involved in an accident, 
the accused said that he thought someone had run 
into him and he offered to show the officer the 
damage to his vehicle. He left his apartment and 
walked about 20 feet to the stairway while the 
officer followed. The accused was “stumbling” and 
“staggering”. He was taken to the police station 
where  breathalyzer readings of 270 mg%, 230 mg% 
and 230 mg% were obtained. He was charged with 
impaired driving and over 80 mg%.
Saskatchewan Provincial Court
The judge concluded, among  other 
things, that the officer exceeded the 
common law implied licence to knock 
doctrine when he went to the apartment 
to see if the accused had been the driver of the car 
involved in the accident and to determine whether 
his ability to operate  a  motor vehicle  was impaired. 
The judge found the officer approached the door 
“for the purpose of searching  and obtaining 
evidence against the occupant.” As such, the officer 
had exceeded his authority under the implied 
license doctrine and was engaged in a search of the 
occupant’s home. The accused’s s. 8  Charter right to 
be secure against unreasonable  search and seizure 
had been breached and all of the  evidence obtained 
by police was excluded under s. 24(2). The accused 
was acquitted of both charges.
Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench
The Crown successfully appealed the 
acquittals and a new trial was ordered. 
An appeal judge found the officer did 
not exceed the implied licence doctrine. 
The officer did not arrest the accused in his 
dwelling. Rather, he merely approached the 
accused’s home to communicate with him about the 
accident and the report of a possible  impaired driver. 
“Where the sole purpose  of the police officer is to 
ask questions of the home owner, no evidence is 
gathered until the occupant chooses to speak,” said 
the appeal judge. “Investigative questioning  does not 
exceed the bounds of the implied right to approach 
and knock and is not trespassory  or in breach of s. 8 
of the Charter.” The accused’s s. 8 rights were not 
breached and there  was no need to consider the 
exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2). 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
The accused then appealed the 
order of a new trial. In his 
view, the conduct of the police 
amounted to an unreasonable 
search contrary to s. 8 of the Charter and the appeal 
judge erred in finding  otherwise. The evidence 
obtained by police ought not to have been admitted 
and he sought the restoration of his acquittals on the 
charges.  
Implied Licence
Under the common law, an occupant of a dwelling 
house gives an implied licence (or invitation)  to any 
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member of the public (including  a police officer)  to 
approach the door and knock. This licence, 
however, extends no further that what is required to 
permit convenient communication with the 
occupant. If the police exceed this licenced 
purpose, such as approaching  to secure evidence 
against the occupant, their conduct falls outside the 
bounds of implied licence and they are engaged in 
an unauthorized search, thus breaching  s. 8. This 
does not mean, however, that the  police exceed 
implied l icence simply because they are 
investigating  a potential criminal offence or are 
looking  for information about an actual offence, 
even when they have reasonable grounds. 
Justice Jackson, speaking  for the Court of Appeal, 
recognized that the purpose for the police approach 
to the door, which sometimes is not easy to 
perceive, is critical in determining  whether implied 
licence to knock has been exceeded:
The investigation of the crime of drinking  and 
driving, or a similar offence, necessarily entails 
the potential to obtain evidence from conversing 
with or observing the person answering  the 
door. Nonetheless, based on my review of the 
authorities, I have concluded that if a trial judge 
finds on all of the evidence a police officer 
knocked on the door to a residence for the 
purpose of securing evidence against the 
occupant, the officer is conducting a search 
within the meaning  of s.  8  of the Charter. This 
principle applies equally to drinking and driving 
offences as well as to other offences where 
observing  the person opening the door will give 
visual, auditory and olfactory clues about the 
person’s participation in the crime under 
investigation. [emphasis added, para. 29]
In this case, the officer testified that his purpose was 
not just to investigate but to determine whether the 
accused was impaired. The officer’s express purpose 
in knocking  on the accused’s door to obtain and 
secure evidence as to whether the occupant, who 
was recently seen driving  a  motor vehicle, was 
impaired could not be ignored. This purpose 
exceeded the implied licence doctrine, the police 
conduct was unreasonable  and all of the evidence 
that the  police gathered to support the breath 
demands flowed from the officer’s decision to knock 
on the door. This evidence was inadmissible  under s. 
24(2), the accused’s appeal was allowed and his 
acquittals entered at trial were restored.  
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
Editor’s note: BAC readings taken from R. v. 
Rogers, 2014 KQB 167.
“[I]f ... a police officer knocked on the door to a residence for the purpose of securing 
evidence against the occupant, the officer is conducting a search within the meaning of 
s. 8 of the Charter. This principle applies equally to drinking and driving offences as well 
as to other offences where observing the person opening the door will give visual, 
auditory and olfactory clues about the person’s participation in the crime under 
investigation.”
Excerpt from the Officer’s Testimony
Lawyer:  So your purpose in attending at 
	 Mr. Rogers’ home was to determine 
	 whether he had been the person driving, 
	 correct?
Officer: Yes.
Lawyer: And more importantly, whether his 
	 ability to operate a motor vehicle was 
	 impaired.
Officer: Yes.
Lawyer: 	And you would agree that the 
	 observation made of a suspected 
	 impaired driver’s appearance, demeanour, 
	 speech, and actions are critical pieces of 
	 investigation in an impaired driving 
	 investigation?
Officer: Yes. They are what form my grounds.
The Court of Appeal found the officer’s 
testimony supported the trial judge’s conclusion 
that the officer approached the apartment door 
for the purpose of securing evidence.
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COULD	HAVE,	NOT	WOULD	
HAVE,	IS	PROPER	TEST	IN	
ASSESSING	SEARCH	WARRANT
R. v. Loewen, 2016 BCCA 351
As part of an investigation code named 
Project E-Papua, police contacted dial-
a-dope phone lines and undercover 
officers purchased drugs from at least 
two of them. Police  also received 
information from two confidential informers that the 
accused was providing  drugs to several street-level 
dealers. Based on this information, the police set up 
surveillance on the accused’s home. Over a period 
of a couple of months they saw a number of 
individuals, including  the one’s selling  to undercover 
officers, coming  and going  from the residence. The 
vast majority  of these individuals stayed for less than 
10 minutes, but some also came for visits 
substantially longer and well outside the range of 
time for which one might infer they were there to 
affect a drug transaction. 
Police prepared an ITO which set out the informer 
information and their credibility, police surveillance 
observations and the information relating  to the prior 
criminal histories of certain targets of the police 
investigation. Included in the ITO was information 
on how the police showed the informers a single 
photograph of targeted individuals in order to 
identify  them. A search warrant was issued for the 
accused’s residence and car. It was executed and 
police seized drugs, cash and other evidence. The 
accused was charged with possessing  cocaine, 
heroin and cannabis, all for the purpose of 
trafficking. 
British Columbia Provincial Court
The accused argued that the ITO, which 
had been heavily  edited to remove any 
information that could disclose the 
identity  of the confidential informers, 
contained insufficient grounds upon which it could 
be granted. Thus, in the accused’s view, the warrant 
had not been lawfully issued. 
The judge found that the vast majority  of the  ITO 
contained bald, unsupported assertions, their 
reliability of which could not be assessed. Among 
many things, the judge criticized the general 
statement that informer A had provided information 
in the past resulting  in drugs being  seized and 
persons arrested as an example. There was nothing 
about how current the information was or its 
frequency, and there were no details about how 
much the informer was paid. The judge also 
criticized the identification process in showing  the 
informers a single photograph to elicit their 
identification rather than using  the procedures 
outlined by commissions such as the Sophonow 
Inquiry. He also highlighted the use of “boilerplate 
language” and “cutting  and pasting” in preparing  the 
ITO. The judge went on to conclude that the ITO did 
not contain “sufficient independently verifiable 
information on which this warrant could reasonably 
have been issued.” The warrant was set aside. The 
search then, in effect, became warrantless, breached 
s. 8 of the Charter and the evidence was excluded 
under s. 24(2). The charges against the  accused were 
dismissed. 
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The Crown appealed the trial 
judge’s decision arguing  he 
erred in setting  aside the 
warrant. The proper test in 
assessing  the validity  of a  search warrant is not for 
the reviewing  judge to substitute their view for that 
of the  authorizing  judge. Rather, “if, based on the 
record which was before the authorizing  judge as 
amplified on the review, the reviewing  judge 
Volume 16 Issue 4 - July/August 2016
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concludes that the authorizing  judge could have 
granted the authorization, then [the reviewing  judge] 
should not interfere.” In the  Crown’s view, the trial 
judge conducted a  de novo (fresh)  review of the 
warrant (whether he  would have been issued it) 
rather than determining  whether the authorizing 
judge could have issued it. 
Chief Justice Bauman, writing  the unanimous Appeal 
Court judgment, agreed with the Crown. He found 
the trial judge did substitute his opinion for that of 
the authorizing  judge. For example, the trial judge 
pondered the inference to be drawn from the fact 
known drug  runners frequented the accused’s house 
for very brief visits. He noted these visits were not 
only  consistent with individuals picking  up drugs to 
be distributed at street level, as asserted by the 
affiant, but also consistent with individuals 
delivering  drugs to a drug  consumer within the 
house or with an individual coming  to see someone 
but they were not home. Whichever inference was 
to be drawn from the evidence was for the 
authorizing  judge to make. It was not for the 
reviewing judge to re-weigh.  
The trial judge also failed to look at the totality of the 
circumstances in properly assessing  the informer 
information. “In assessing  the  totality of the 
circumstances one must look to (a) the extent to 
which the information predicting  the criminal 
offence is compelling, i.e. the  extent of detail 
provided; (b)  the credibility or reliability  of the 
source; and (c) the extent of corroboration,” said 
Chief Justice Bauman. As for the extent of 
corroboration, the informers’ information was 
corroborated by  independent investigation in a 
number of respects. 
Finally, the trial judge improperly imported trial 
standards, such as the use of “bad character 
evidence” and police “photograph identification 
procedures”, into the search warrant review. “A 
search warrant is an investigative tool,” said Chief 
Justice Bauman. “Its justification rests on reasonable 
grounds, not proof beyond a  reasonable doubt.” He 
continued:
In my view, the judge here embarked on a 
similarly flawed analysis by importing a trial 
type analysis into his consideration of the “bad 
character” evidence and the photo identification 
of various players in the matter. There is no rule 
precluding the inclusion of such information in 
an ITO so long as the prior criminal activity is 
relevant to the matter under investigation. The 
exception is for facts leading  to charges that 
have been dismissed or judicially stayed. Nor is 
there a ru le requi r ing  any par t icu lar 
identification procedure in an ITO or the 
investigation upon which it is based. In any 
event, the identifications here were not made by 
witnesses unfamiliar with the subjects, who may 
have only caught a momentary glimpse of them. 
The dangers with eyewitness identification are 
absent here or at least greatly attenuated. 
[reference omitted, para. 51]
The trial judge conducted a de novo review of the 
ITO (the material founding  the issuance of the 
warrant)  and  failed to assess the material in light of 
the totality of the circumstances. The authorizing 
justice could have granted the  warrant. The Crown’s 
appeal was allowed, the accused’s acquittals were 
set aside and a new trial was ordered.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
Note-able Quote
“Nothing in life is to be feared. It is only to be 
understood.” - Marie Curie
“A search warrant is an investigative tool. 
Its justification rests on reasonable 
grounds, not proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”
“In assessing the totality of the circumstances one must look to (a) the extent to which 
the information predicting the criminal offence is compelling, i.e. the extent of detail 
provided; (b) the credibility or reliability of the source; and (c) the extent of 
corroboration.”
The BC LEDN is a sub-committee of the British Columbia Association of Chiefs of Police with representation from the following participating agencies.
BCLEDN
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WHAT	IS	THE	BC	LAW	
ENFORCEMENT	DIVERSITY	
NETWORK?
The British  Columbia Law Enforcement Diversity 
Network (BCLEDN) is a group of concerned and 
motivated members of the law enforcement  
community. Its goal is to champion diversity by 
identifying  contemporary  global issues. This year, on 
November 2, 2016, the BCLEDN is hosting 
“Challenges in  Modern Day Law Enforcement” at 
the JIBC. They hope to see you there  and encourage 
members from other agencies not currently 
represented on the committee  to be  a part of their 
team. If you are interested please contact 
lstewart@jibc.ca. 
FENTANYL	EXCLUDED:	FAILURE	
TO	s.	10(b)	ON	INVESTIGATIVE	
DETENTION	WAS	SERIOUS
R. v. Daley, 2016 ONCA 564
Two women, the accused and her 
passenger, went to a Money Mart. The 
accused went inside to pawn some 
jewelry while the other woman waited 
in the car outside. A store employee 
called the police as the jewelry  looked like photos of 
stolen jewelry seen in a police flyer. When police 
attended, the accused was detained in the store for 
about 40 minutes. She was not advised of her right 
to counsel and, in response to a question, told 
police she had arrived in a car that was parked 
outside. 
Another officer approached the passenger (Stockton), 
sitting  in the  accused’s car. When Stockton reached 
into her purse for ID, the police officer saw a 
bracelet that he thought resembled some of the 
jewelry in the police flyer. He arrested Stockton and 
searched the car. In it, he found two purses, which 
he also searched. In one of the purses, police found 
a flip  knife. After the accused identified it as her 
purse, she was arrested for possessing  a prohibited 
weapon. During  her arrest, she was patted down and 
seven fentanyl patches were found in her jacket 
pocket. She was charged with possessing  fentanyl for 
the purpose of trafficking.
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The accused submitted that her Charter 
rights under ss. 8, 9, and 10(b)  had been 
violated and she sought the exclusion of 
evidence under s. 24(2). The judge found 
that s. 10(b) had been violated. “The police...knew 
that she was supposed to be cautioned and read her 
rights, and they did not do it,” said the judge. “Their 
failure was patent, and there  is no excuse for it.” 
However, the judge did not conduct a  s. 24(2) 
analysis because the s. 10(b) violation, he held, did 
not impugn the subsequent searches. 
As for ss. 8  and 9 of the Charter, the judge 
concluded there were no breaches. He found the 
accused’s detention was not arbitrary, except to the 
extent she was not advised about her right to 
counsel. “In the circumstances of this case, 40 
minutes is not so long  a detention to be arbitrary, 
given the pieces of jewelry, the number of them, and 
the quality of the flyer that they  were trying  to 
compare to,” he said. As for the search, it was not 
conducted as an incident to the accused’s detention 
inside the store. Rather, the police had sufficient 
grounds to arrest the passenger and search the 
purses incidental to the passenger’s arrest. The 
accused was convicted of possessing  fentanyl for the 
purpose of trafficking. 
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused argued that the 
trial judge erred in requiring  a 
causal connection between the 
s. 10(b) violation and the 
obtaining  of evidence. As well, she alleged the judge 
mistakenly concluded that her ss. 8  and 9 rights had 
not been violated. She contended that the evidence 
ought to have been excluded under s. 24(2). 
s. 10(b) > s. 24(2)
The Court of Appeal agreed that the judge erred in 
requiring  a causal connection between the s. 10(b) 
breach and the obtaining  of the  evidence. Rather, a 
see  
page 8
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s. 24(2)  analysis is triggered by a demonstration that 
the evidence was “obtained in a manner” that 
infringed a Charter right. “This does not require that 
the violation cause the  police to obtain the 
evidence, only that there be a nexus or connection 
between the two,” said the Appeal Court. “In this 
case, there  was a clear temporal and contextual 
connection between the violation of the [accused’s] 
s. 10(b)  rights, the discovery of the  knife in her 
purse, and, ultimately, the discovery of the fentanyl.”
s. 9 - Arbitrary Detention
As for the trial judge’s ruling  that the accused’s 
detention was not arbitrary, there was no basis on 
which to make an objective assessment on the issue 
of whether the 40 minute detention was justified. 
There was no evidence regarding  the  number of 
pieces of jewelry, the police flyer was not introduced 
into evidence and the evidence about the activities 
of the police officers in the store was limited to the 
officers’ testimony that they spent an unspecified 
portion of their time in the store comparing  an 
unspecified number of pieces of jewelry to the flyer. 
“In our view, the lack of explanation regarding  what 
occurred at the  store coupled with the failure of the 
officers to give the [accused] her s.10 (b)  rights over 
the course of 40 minutes made the detention 
arbitrary,” said the Court of Appeal.
s. 8 - Unreasonable Search
The trial judge did not err in finding  that the search 
of the accused’s purse was reasonable as an incident 
to the passenger’s lawful arrest. The officer did not 
arrest the passenger Stockton so that he could search 
the accused’s car. Instead, once the police officer 
saw a piece of jewelry in the  passenger's purse that 
resembled a piece in the police flyer, he had 
reasonable grounds to believe she committed an 
offence and to make the arrest.  
The accused’s purse was immediately beside the 
passenger and it was open. “The police officer was 
entitled to search it for evidence of the offence, 
weapons, or means of escape – i.e. for contraband 
that Ms. Stockton might have disposed of there,” said 
the Court of Appeal. “Thus, the  search was 
connected to the reason for the arrest.” 
24(2) - Exclusion of Evidence
Since the  trial judge did not conduct a s. 24(2) 
analysis, the  Court of Appeal did so. It found the 
nature of police conduct favoured exclusion. “The 
breach of s. 10(b) was ‘patent’ and unexplained –  in 
an area of law that is not complex or unsettled. 
These  were not minor or inadvertent breaches of ss. 
9 and 10(b) . There were no extenuat ing 
circumstances to explain or attenuate the 
seriousness of the  officers’ conduct. Overall, the 
police conduct in this case demonstrated a disregard 
for well-established Charter rights.” 
As for the impact of the breach on the  accused’s 
Charter protected interests, it favoured exclusion as 
well. “The impact on the [accused’s] Charter rights 
was substantial. The arbitrary detention was not 
“In this case, there was a clear temporal 
and contextual connection between the 
violation of the [accused’s] s. 10(b) 
rights, the discovery of the knife in her 
purse, and, ultimately, the discovery of 
the fentanyl.”
What the trial judge said about 
the purse search:
“[W]as it reasonable for [the officer] to search [the 
accused’s] purse incidental the arrest? I find that it 
was reasonable for him to search her purse incidental 
to the arrest of Ms. Stockton.
It was located immediately beside where Ms. Stockton 
was sitting, and so was within easy reach. It was open, 
affording easy access to her if she wanted to hide 
stolen property, something small, like jewelry. The purse 
was not then within Ms. Daley’s possession or control.
The search was incidental to the offence for which 
Ms. Stockton was arrested, he was entitled, as a matter 
of law, to seek additional evidence with respect to 
possession of stolen property, which is the offence for 
which Ms. Stockton was arrested, and also to look for 
possible weapons or tools of escape accessible to her.”
excerpt from voir dire ruling
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fleeting. The [accused] was detained for 40 minutes 
and never advised of her right to counsel. 
Furthermore, it is at least possible that what followed 
– talking  to Ms. Stockton in the  [accused's] car, her 
arrest, the  search of the car and purse, the discovery 
of the knife, and the [accused’s] own arrest – might 
not have occurred but for this violation.”
Finally, the truth-seeking  function of the criminal 
trial process favoured admissibility. “Society has an 
interest in the prosecution of persons who possess 
narcotics for the purpose of trafficking. Fentanyl is a 
very dangerous drug. The exclusion of this reliable 
and objective evidence would defeat the 
prosecution’s ability to prove  the case against the 
[accused] and would undermine the truth-seeking 
function of the justice system.”
After balancing  the three s. 24(2) factors, the Court 
of Appeal excluded the evidence. “The conduct of 
the police in failing  to provide the [accused] with 
her s. 10(b) rights over the course of 40 minutes 
while they conducted an investigation was serious,” 
said the Court of Appeal. “The impact on the 
[accused’s] Charter-protected rights was substantial. 
In our view, these factors outweigh” the truth-
seeking  function of the criminal trial process. The 
accused’s appeal was allowed, the fentanyl was 
excluded and the accused’s conviction was quashed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
Editor’s note: Additional facts taken from Ontario 
Superior Court of Justice voir dire ruling.
Note-able Quote
“What is the difference between an obstacle and an 
opportunity? Our attitude toward it. Every 
opportunity has a difficulty, and every difficulty has 
an opportunity.”  - J. Sidlow Baxter
STANDARD	FIELD	SOBRIETY	
TESTING	TESTIMONY	NOT	
EXPERT	EVIDENCE
R. v. Parada, 2016 SKCA 102 
At 12:30 am a police officer stopped 
the accused after observing  her 
vehicle drive over the  centre line, go 
over the shoulder line, and move back 
over the centre line of the  roadway. 
The officer noted the accused was having  trouble 
extracting  her driver’s licence and he could smell a 
strong  odour of alcohol. When asked if she had been 
drinking, the  accused indicated that she had drank 
three  beers. The officer formed the opinion the 
accused had alcohol in her body and, since he did 
not have an approved screening  device with him, 
read a demand to the accused for her to perform 
sobriety tests.
The officer, certified to administer sobriety tests, had 
the accused perform the  horizontal gaze nystagmus 
test, the walk-and-turn  test and the one-leg stand 
test. After the tests were conducted, the officer 
formed the opinion that the accused had committed 
an offence under s.  253 of the Criminal Code. The 
accused was arrested, taken to the police station and 
breath tests were obtained resulting  in readings of 
150 mg% x 2. She was charged with impaired 
driving and driving over 80 mg%. 
“The conduct of the police in failing to 
provide the [accused] with her s. 10(b) 
rights over the course of 40 minutes 
while they conducted an investigation 
was serious.”
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Saskatchewan Provincial Court
The judge concluded that the officer’s 
evidence concerning  the physical 
coordination tests was not “expert 
testimony” and therefore the Crown was 
not required to follow the statutory  procedures for 
expert evidence under s. 657.3 of the Criminal 
Code. In the judge’s view, s. 254(2)  provides that a 
“peace officer” has the power to demand an 
approved screening  device test or physical 
coordination tests. If a  person fails an approved 
screening  device test, the Crown is not required to 
call an expert to explain how the approved 
screening  device works or the significance of a pass, 
warn, or fail reading. The judge determined that the 
physical coordination tests were no different. If 
Parliament intended the physical coordination tests 
to be carried out by an expert, they would have 
called the peace officer an expert as was done in the 
case of an “evaluating  officer” (aka. drug  recognition 
expert)  in s. 254(3.1). The accused was convicted of 
driving over 80 mg%.
Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench
The accused appealed his conviction 
arguing, among  other things, that the 
testimony related to the standard field 
sobriety tests was expert opinion 
testimony. However, the appeal judge opined that 
the trial judge correctly determined that the officer’s 
testimony about the sobriety test results was not 
expert evidence. The officer’s evidence was used 
only  to determine if he had reasonable  grounds to 
believe the accused had committed an offence 
under s. 253  within the previous three hours and 
could therefore demand a breath sample under s. 
254(3). The trial judge did not rely on the officer’s 
estimations as to what the breathalyzer readings 
would be nor did he use  his testimony to determine 
whether the accused was impaired. Sobriety  tests 
under s. 254(2)  is an alternative to using  an 
approved screening  device, neither of which 
requires qualification as an expert. The accused’s 
appeal was dismissed. 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
The accused appealed his 
conviction again arguing, in 
part, that the officer’s evidence 
about the sobriety tests was 
expert evidence such that it was subject to an expert 
evidence voir dire (aka. a Mohan inquiry - R. v 
Mohan, [1994] 2 SCR 9). 
“Section 254(2) is clear that a “peace officer” may demand that a suspected impaired 
driver perform the sobriety tests. There are no special qualifications or training needed 
for an officer to be properly authorized by the Criminal Code to conduct an investigation 
under this first stage of the scheme.”
BY THE BOOK:
Alcohol/Drug	Testing: Criminal Code
Testing for presence of alcohol or a drug
s. 254 (2)  If a peace officer has reasonable 
grounds to suspect that a person has alcohol or 
a drug in their body and that the person has, 
within the preceding three hours, operated a 
motor vehicle ... or had the care or control of a motor 
vehicle ..., whether it was in motion or not, the peace officer 
may, by demand, require the person to comply with 
paragraph (a), in the case of a drug, or with either or both 
of paragraphs (a) and (b), in the case of alcohol:
(a) to perform forthwith physical coordination tests 
prescribed by regulation to enable the peace officer to 
determine whether a demand may be made under 
subsection (3) or (3.1) and, if necessary, to accompany 
the peace officer for that purpose; and
(b) to provide forthwith a sample of breath that, in the 
peace officer’s opinion, will enable a proper analysis to 
be made by means of an approved screening device and, 
if necessary, to accompany the peace officer for that 
purpose.
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Peace Officer Opinion Evidence
Generally, opinion evidence is inadmissible unless it 
falls in one of three exceptions:
• Expert opinion evidence: An expert performs 
the function of providing  the judge and jury with 
a ready-made inference which the judge and jury 
are unable to draw due to the technical nature of 
the subject matter. This evidence is an exception 
to the general rule  against opinion evidence 
because the expert witness has specialized 
knowledge, skill, or experience and is needed to 
assist the trier of fact to form a proper conclusion. 
Admissibility of expert evidence depends on four 
criteria: (1) relevance; (2)  necessity  in assisting  the 
trier of fact; (3)  the absence of any exclusionary 
rule; and (4) a properly qualified expert. 
• Layperson opinion evidence: “Lay witnesses” 
can give opinion evidence on issues that do not 
require special knowledge and where it is 
virtually  impossible to separate  the facts from the 
inferences based on those facts. This could 
include such things as the identification of 
handwriting, persons and things, apparent age, 
the bodily plight or condition of a person, the 
emotional state  of a person, the condition of 
things, certain questions of value, estimates of 
speed and distance, and whether someone was 
intoxicated, as it is not such an exceptional 
condition as would require a medical expert to 
diagnose it. Admissibility of layperson opinion 
evidence depends on whether: (1) the witness has 
personal knowledge of observed facts; (2)  the 
witness is in a better position than the trier of fact 
to draw the inference; (3)  the witness has the 
necessary experiential capacity to draw the 
inference; and (4)  the opinion is a  compendious 
mode of speaking  (the witness could not as 
accurately, adequately, and with reasonable 
facility describe the  facts he or she is testifying 
about).
• Certification by statute and/or regulations: 
For example, impaired driving  provisions in the 
Criminal Code  and the Regulations allow for a 
peace officer to give opinion evidence.
Impaired Driving Scheme
In this case, the Court of Appeal ruled that the 
evidence of a  peace officer relating  to standard field 
sobriety tests did not constitute expert opinion 
evidence necessitating  a Mohan  voir dire. First, the 
impaired driving  statutory scheme does not require 
that a peace officer be  qualified as an expert 
witness. An officer is authorized to require drivers to 
perform physical coordination tests under s.  254(2)
(a) and the results of the physical coordination tests 
may be used to provide reasonable grounds for 
arrest and a demand for a  breath test under s. 253(3) 
BY THE BOOK:
Evaluation	of	Impaired	Operation	(Drugs	
and	Alcohol)	Regulations: Criminal Code
Physical Coordination Tests
2  The physical coordination tests to be 
conducted under paragraph 254(2)(a) of the 
Criminal Code are the following standard field 
sobriety tests:
(a) the horizontal gaze nystagmus test;
(b) the walk-and-turn test; and
(c) the one-leg stand test.
How the Accused Performed
Horizontal gaze nystagmus test 
The accused scored six out of six. The officer testified that 
a score of four out of six would mean it is highly likely the 
person has a blood alcohol level greater than 0.10, and a 
score of six out of six would make the likelihood higher. 
Walk-and-turn test 
The accused scored seven out of eight in the walk-and-
turn test. A fail is a score of two out of eight. The accused 
made several missteps, took the wrong number of steps, 
and used her arms for balance. 
One-leg stand test 
The accused scored four out of four in the one-leg stand 
test,  a fail score. 
Results
The officer testified that if a person fails one test out of 
three there is a 65%–68% chance that person’s blood 
alcohol level is 0.10 or more. This percentage rises to 80% 
if two tests out of three are failed.
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on an approved instrument. “It would be contrary  to 
the apparent purpose  ... to then require the Crown to 
qualify the arresting  officer as an expert witness to 
explain how he or she utilized the directions given 
by Parliament to make the impaired driving 
investigation,” said Justice Herauf speaking  for the 
Court of Appeal. “This would effectively weaken the 
ability of police and prosecutors to investigate and 
prosecute impaired drivers.” He continued:
It is important to note that there are certain 
limitations in the Criminal Code and the 
common law that are aimed at preserving a 
defendant’s right to a fair trial. Section 254(2) 
only authorizes the peace officer to conduct the 
three tests prescribed under s.  2 of the 
Regulations, namely, the “horizontal gaze 
nystagmus” test, the “walk-and-turn” test, and 
the “one-leg stand” test. The restriction to these 
three tests is presumably designed to help ensure 
that the driver’s Charter rights are interfered with 
minimally and shows that Parliament is satisfied 
that the science underlying the tests support their 
use.
Section 254(2) is clear that a “peace officer” may 
demand that a suspected impaired driver 
perform the sobriety tests. There are no special 
qualifications or training  needed for an officer to 
be properly authorized by the Criminal Code to 
conduct an investigation under this first stage of 
the scheme. The regulations are specific as to 
what coordination tests shall be completed, and 
the performance by the driver may be used to 
enable the officer to determine whether a further 
demand may be made. It is not until this second 
stage of the scheme (under ss.  254(3) or 
254(3.1)) that the officer must be a “qualified 
technician” or an “evaluating officer” to 
determine the driver’s blood alcohol content or 
determine impairment by drug or combination 
of drug and alcohol. This implies that Parliament 
did not intend to require an officer to have any 
kind of special training  or knowledge to perform 
the sobriety tests and be qualified to testify to its 
results. ... [references omitted, paras. 34-36]
The officer did not need to be qualified as an expert 
and therefore a Mohan voir dire was not necessary.
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
GENERAL	WARRANT	MAY	
AUTHORIZE	BEDPAN	VIGIL
R. v. Poirier, 2016 ONCA 582 (CanLII)
The police received information from 
five confidential informers that the 
accused was a drug  addict actively 
dealing  in heroin, methamphetamine, 
and oxycodone. The information 
indicated that the accused stored significant 
quantities of drugs in plastic baggies in his rectum, 
only  briefly removing  the drugs to make a sale. On 
the basis of this and other information, police sought 
a general warrant under s. 487.01 of the Criminal 
Code  that would, after police received information 
that the accused was in possession of a large 
quantity  of heroin or crystal meth, authorize  his 
detention until the drugs could be recovered from 
his rectum. After receiving  a tip  from one of their 
confidential sources that the accused was in 
possession of heroin, crystal methamphetamine, 
cocaine, and other substances, and that the drugs 
were packaged to be inserted in his rectum, the 
warrant was executed. 
The accused was arrested at 
1:32 pm and transported to 
the police  station. He was 
strip searched in an open-
door room, which was 
inadvertently recorded by a  video camera. He was 
read the terms of the warrant and spoke to a lawyer. 
He was placed in a  “dry cell”, which had no running 
water and a covered sink and toilet. He was 
handcuffed to the bars of the cell such that he could 
sit or lie down on a bench next to the cell door, but 
only  reach as low as his chest. About 21 hours later, 
the police placed oven mitts on his hands and 
secured them with duct tape. He had more freedom 
of movement but was still prevented him from 
accessing  his rectal area. He remained handcuffed 
but was no longer chained to the bars of the cell.
The accused subsequently asked to be taken to the 
washroom and at 11:53  am passed two packages in 
only  a small amount of watery stool. Each package 
contained 28  grams of crystal methamphetamine. 
He said that was all he was carrying. Without a 
significant bowel movement, the  officers did not 
[...]
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believe  him. He later had two more bowel 
movements, one containing  28  grams of heroin and 
the other containing  heroin, cocaine, and Dilaudid 
pills. The last bowel movement occurred some 30 
hours after his initial detention. Satisfied there were 
no more drugs inside the accused, his handcuffs 
were removed and he was moved out of the dry cell. 
He was told he would be charged with possessing 
crystal methamphetamine, heroin, cocaine and 
Dilaudid for the purpose of trafficking. He was then 
brought before a justice for the first time after 
spending a total of 43 hours in police detention. 
Ontario Superior Court of Justice 
The accused argued that the general 
warrant was unlawful and that he had 
been subject to arbitrary detention and 
imprisonment under s. 9. As well, he 
submitted that the manner in which the bedpan vigil 
was carried out violated his rights under s. 8, and 
that his right to security of the person had been 
violated under s. 7. He sought the exclusion of 
evidence under s. 24(2).
The police said they detained the  accused in the 
manner they did because they did not want him to 
be able to remove the drugs from his rectum and 
perhaps swallow them or otherwise destroy or 
conceal them. The door to the cell was left open so 
that officers monitoring  the accused could enter 
quickly if needed so as to prevent the destruction of 
evidence, or to check on his medical condition. The 
judge found the accused’s Charter rights had not 
been breached. The accused was convicted of 
possessing  heroin (1.5 ounces), cocaine (7 grams), 
and crystal methamphetamine (2 ounces)  for the 
purpose of trafficking  and simple possession of 
hydromorphone (Dilaudid). He was sentenced to 10 
years in prison. 
 
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused contended that a 
general warrant could not be 
issued for a bedpan vigil 
because  a bedpan vigil is not a 
search; it is a detention. As well, the general warrant 
purported to authorize non-compliance with s. 503 
of the Criminal Code which requires that an accused 
person be taken before a justice “without 
unreasonable delay and in any event within a period 
of 24 hours”. 
He also suggested that the warrant was executed in 
an unreasonable manner contrary to s. 8  of the 
Charter. Further, he asserted that the detention 
jeopardized his right to life and security of the 
person under s. 7 because the monitoring  of his 
medical condition was inadequate. He again sought 
the exclusion of the drugs under s. 24(2) of the 
Charter.
BY THE BOOK:
General	Warrant: Criminal Code
Information for General Warrant
s. 487.01 (1)  A provincial court judge ... may 
issue a warrant in writing authorizing a peace 
officer to, subject to this section, use any 
device or investigative technique or procedure 
or do any thing described in the warrant that 
would, if not authorized, constitute an unreasonable search 
or seizure in respect of a person or a person’s property if
(a) the judge is satisfied by information on oath in writing 
that there are reasonable grounds to believe that an 
offence against this or any other Act of Parliament has 
been or will be committed and that information 
concerning the offence will be obtained through the use 
of the technique, procedure or device or the doing of 
the thing;
(b) the judge is satisfied that it is in the best interests of 
the administration of justice to issue the warrant; and
(c) there is no other provision in this or any other Act of 
Parliament that would provide for a warrant, 
authorization or order permitting the technique, 
procedure or device to be used or the thing to be done.
Limitation
(2) Nothing in subsection (1) shall be construed as to 
permit interference with the bodily integrity of any 
person.
...
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General Warrant
Justice Weiler, authoring  the Court of Appeal’s 
unanimous judgment, found that a bedpan vigil was 
a search that could be authorized by a general 
warrant:
[A] bedpan vigil search is a search within the 
meaning of s. 8  of the Charter. A general warrant 
issued under s. 487.01 can authorize a bedpan 
vigil search. The fact that detention of the 
individual is necessary to conduct a bedpan vigil 
search does not, in itself, make the warrant 
invalid. [para. 49]
And further:
In this case, I would hold that the requirements 
of s. 487.01(1) were met. The issuing judge was 
satisfied that there were reasonable grounds to 
believe that the [accused] had trafficked drugs; 
given the issuance of the warrant and the harm 
to society from illicit drug  trafficking, it can be 
inferred he was satisfied that the second 
requirement was also met; finally, no other 
provision in the Criminal Code or any other Act 
of Par l iament provides for a warrant , 
authorization or order permitting a bedpan vigil 
search. [para. 30]
A s. 487.01 warrant “includes doing  what is 
reasonable necessary to carry out the search, and 
may include detention. The length and nature of 
detention required must take into consideration the 
nature of the search to be conducted and the 
necessity  to conduct that type of search,” said Justice 
Weiler. “I would hold that the fact that a  bedpan 
vigil search takes time and involves the detention of 
the individual while the search is carried out does 
not make it any less a search.” 
What the Warrant said:
1. When one of five proven, reliable Confidential Sources 
referred to in this Application provides information that 
[the accused] is currently in possession of a large 
supply of Heroin and/or Crystal Methamphetamine, 
Officers of the Sarnia Police will locate [the accused] at 
the first opportunity outside of a dwelling residence 
and immediately place him under arrest at that time for 
possession for the purpose of trafficking Heroin and/or 
Crystal Methamphetamine.
2. [The accused] will be brought to the Sarnia Police 
Station.  The warrant will be shown and explained to 
[the accused].
3. [The accused] will be given an opportunity to contact 
his legal counsel.
4. [The accused] will be taken to a cell where his actions 
will be constantly monitored by officers of the same 
sex.
5. [The accused] will be given the opportunity to do one 
of the following:
i) Voluntarily, in the presence of Officers of the same 
sex, remove the package of Heroin and/or Crystal 
Methamphetamine from his rectum. If [the accused] 
does voluntarily remove only a single package from 
inside of his rectum, [the accused] will still be 
required to provide a bowel movement which will 
satisfy the Officer’s belief that there are no more 
drugs inside of his rectum. This is due to the 
information provided by all Sources with respect to 
the amounts of drugs and multiple packages that [the 
accused] will conceal up inside of his rectum at all 
times, in order to ensure that all of the drugs have 
been removed or vacated from inside of [the 
accused]’s rectum.
ii) Voluntarily have a bowel movement, in the presence 
of Officers of the same sex, significant enough to 
dislodge the package of Heroin and/or Crystal 
Methamphetamine from inside of his rectum, or 
enough to satisfy Officer’s monitoring that no 
further packages exists within his rectum.
6. Should [the accused] refuse to cooperate with the 
provisions outlined in the terms and conditions found 
in Appendix “A”, then [the accused]’s detention shall 
continue until he has a bowel movement, significant 
enough to satisfy the Officer’s monitoring to remove 
the package of Heroin and/or Crystal 
Methamphetamine or, to have a bowel movement 
significant enough to satisfy the Officer’s monitoring 
that no packages exists within the rectum of [the 
accused].
The warrant authorized police action from 
November 20, 2012 to December 19, 2012.
“[A] bedpan vigil search is a search 
within the meaning of s. 8 of the 
Charter. A general warrant issued 
under s. 487.01 can authorize a bedpan 
vigil search. The fact that detention of 
the individual is necessary to conduct a 
bedpan vigil search does not, in itself, 
make the warrant invalid.”
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As for whether a bedpan vigil interferes with the 
“bodily integrity  of any person”, a limitation set out 
in the general warrant provisions, the Court of 
Appeal found it did not. A bedpan vigil is passive  in 
nature and does not involve an invasive procedure, 
nor were the police attempting  to collect bodily 
samples containing  personal information relating  to 
the accused:
[A] bedpan vigil search meets the criteria for a 
general warrant set out in s. 487.01(1) and s. 
487.01(2) and does not constitute interference 
with bodily integrity. [para. 48]
s. 503 Criminal Code
The Court of Appeal did, however, find the general 
warrant defective because it did not account for s. 
503  of the Criminal Code. Section 503(1) requires a 
peace officer who arrests a person, with or without a 
warrant, to bring  the person before  a justice, where  a 
justice is available, without unreasonable delay or in 
any event within 24 hours of arrest. The provisions of 
s. 503  are mandatory and cannot be overridden by 
the terms of a general warrant, which in this case 
purported to authorize detaining  the accused 
indefinitely without bringing him before a justice:
Compliance with s. 503 is not simply a matter of 
form. Nor does it matter that the [accused] may 
not likely have been released by a justice of the 
peace while the bedpan vigil search was being 
conducted. If the police had complied with 
s.  503, the manner in which the [accused] 
continued to be detained would have been 
subject to court supervision. The [accused’s] 
detention would have changed from being a 
detention pursuant to the execution of the 
general warrant to a court monitored detention 
that ensured the ongoing  protection of the 
[accused’s] Charter rights.
The valid investigative purpose that the bedpan 
vigil search serves is not undermined by 
compliance with s. 503. As the Crown 
recognized, it would have been open to the 
police to take the [accused] before a justice by 
telephone. Moreover, a justice can remand an 
arrested individual to prison for up to three days 
at the request of the prosecutor under s. 516 of 
the Code. “Prison” is defined in s. 2 of the Code 
as including a “lock-up,” and therefore the cells 
at the police station would appear to come 
within that definition. The police could have 
telephoned a justice of the peace and asked for 
the [accused] to be remanded into their custody 
at the police station for up to three days, or until 
the [accused] had expelled the drugs from his 
rectum, whichever was sooner. [paras. 58-59]
“[A] bedpan vigil search meets the criteria for a general warrant set out in s. 487.01(1) 
and s. 487.01(2) and does not constitute interference with bodily integrity.”
BY THE BOOK:
Appearance	Before	a	Justice: Criminal Code
Taking Before Justice
s. 503(1) A peace officer who arrests a person 
with or without warrant ... shall cause the 
person to be detained in custody and, in 
accordance with the following provisions, to 
be taken before a justice to be dealt with 
according to law:
(a) (where a justice is available within a period of twenty-
four hours after the person has been arrested by or 
delivered to the peace officer, the person shall be taken 
before a justice without unreasonable delay and in any 
event within that period, and
(b) where a justice is not available within a period of 
twenty-four hours after the person has been arrested by 
or delivered to the peace officer, the person shall be 
taken before a justice as soon as possible,
unless, at any time before the expiration of the time 
prescribed in paragraph (a) or (b) for taking the person 
before a justice,
(c) the peace officer or officer in charge releases the 
person under any other provision of this Part, or
(d) the peace officer or officer in charge is satisfied that 
the person should be released from custody, whether 
unconditionally under subsection (4) or otherwise 
conditionally or unconditionally, and so releases him.
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Since the general warrant was defective on the s. 
503  basis, it did not authorize  the search carried out 
in this case.
Search Incident to Arrest
For a warrantless search incident to arrest to be a 
lawful search, the Crown must show: 
1. the accused’s arrest was lawful;
2. the search was for a valid objective related to 
the arrest such as the discovery and 
preservation of evidence; and 
3. the search was executed in a reasonable 
manner.
Here, Justice Weiler found the first and second 
requirements were met: 
• Lawful arrest: The police had reasonable and 
probable grounds to arrest the accused given the 
information they had received from their 
confidential informers that he was in possession of 
a large quantity of drugs. 
• Valid Objective: The search was conducted in 
pursuit of valid purposes connected to the arrest, 
including  protecting  evidence from destruction at 
the hands of the arrestee, and discovering 
evidence which could be used at trial. The police 
had reasonable and probable grounds to believe 
the bedpan vigil would afford evidence of the 
offence for which the accused was arrested. The 
police had reliable information from their 
informers that the accused’s practice was to secret 
the drugs he sold in his rectum and, importantly, 
the police had also been informed that the drugs 
had been packaged for insertion into his rectum. 
The crucial link between the  location and purpose 
of the search incident to arrest and the grounds for 
the arrest was therefore present. The police must 
have reasonable and probable  grounds to believe 
the bedpan vigil search will afford evidence of the 
offence for which the accused was arrested as 
well as reasonable and probable grounds to arrest. 
So, even if a bedpan vigil could be conducted 
incident to arrest, the search in this case was not 
carried out in a reasonable manner. The manner in 
which the search was carried out did not have 
regard for the  accused’s personal dignity as much as 
possible, or for medical concerns specific to him:  
• The strip  search violated the accused’s right to 
privacy. It was not conducted in a private area, but 
an area where one could see into the room; it was 
inadvertently video recorded. Further, rather than 
proceeding  incrementally so as to ensure that the 
accused was not completely undressed at any one 
time, the accused was completely  naked for a 
period of time.
R. v. Poirier Timeline
Date/Time Action
November 20 General Warrant granted
December 5 General Warrant executed
1:32 pm Accused arrested
Accused transported to police station and strip 
searched.
2:10 pm Accused placed “dry cell”. He was handcuffed to 
the bars in his cell.
December 6 Accused still under detention
11:21 am Oven mitts placed over accused’s hands and 
secured with duct tape.
11:53 am Accused passes two packages:
• 28 grams of crystal methamphetamine
• 28 grams of crystal methamphetamine
1:32 pm Accused passes one package:
• 28 grams of heroin
8:10 pm Accused passes one package:
• 14 grams of heroin
• 7 packets of heroin each weighing 0.6 grams
• 1 gram of cocaine
• 8 Dilaudid pills each weighing 8 mg
• two packets of cocaine each weighing 3.5 grams
December 7 Accused brought before a Justice 43 hours after 
his arrest
Times taken from 2016 ONCA 582 & 2014 ONSC 3117.
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• The bedpan vigil was carried out in an 
unreasonable way. The accused was handcuffed to 
the bars of his cell for the first 21 to 22 hours of 
his detention. This use of physical constraint was 
not proportionate to the objective, nor did it strike 
an appropriate balance between the need for 
effective law enforcement and the accused’s 
interests in privacy and dignity. A lesser restriction 
(oven mitts and duct tape) proved equally 
effective at preventing  the accused from removing 
or consuming  the drugs, and allowed him greater 
freedom of movement. 
• The accused was lodged in his cell in long  johns 
and only given his track  pants to wear over top 
after a day had gone by. He had no proper bed, 
and, initially, no bedding. Only after he 
complained of being  cold, likely  due to his 
withdrawal symptoms, was he given a blanket.
• The police knew the  accused was an addict. 
When he began to show symptoms of withdrawal, 
the police made no provision for measures to ease 
his discomfort, such as having  a doctor assess him 
for prescription medication or provide him with 
ordinary Tylenol. The police failed to minimize 
the accused’s discomfort during his detention.
• Believing  that the accused potentially had large 
quantities of heroin and crystal methamphetamine 
stored in his rectum, they had a duty to take 
reasonable steps to ensure that his safety and 
security were not compromised as a result of the 
nature of the search. He was not advised that if he 
felt unwell or wished to see a doctor he  could 
and, when he did ask to see a doctor, no effort 
was made to comply with his request. 
s. 24(2) 
Having  found ss. 7, 8  and 9 Charter breaches, the 
Court of Appeal excluded the drugs under s. 24(2) 
because  its admission into evidence would bring  the 
administration of justice into disrepute. The 
accused’s appeal was allowed, his convictions were 
set aside and acquittal’s were entered on all counts. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
Note-able	Quote
“Success is much more a matter of courage than 
ability.” - Joe Segal
EVEN	IF	RIGHTS	BREACHED,	
DIGITAL	PHOTOS	ADMISSIBLE	
UNDER	s.	24(2)
R. v. Balla, 2016 ABCA 212
 
As part of an investigation into dial-a-
dope drug  trafficking, the police 
executed a search warrant under s. 11 
o f the Cont ro l l ed Drugs and 
Substances Act (CDSA )  a t an 
apartment. The search warrant did not refer to a 
digital camera or images that might be retrieved 
from one but authorized the search for and seizure 
of: 
“Cocaine, weigh scales, packaging materials, 
score sheets, cash, electronic communication 
devices, and documents relating to the 
ownership / occupancy”. 
In the accused’s bedroom, police found a “score 
sheet”,  five cellular telephones, a bullet-proof vest 
plate, ammunition, machetes, various receipts in his 
name, plastic baggies , 0.2 grams of powder cocaine 
and a  digital camera. The 
digital camera contained a 
memory card with many 
pictures, including  photos of 
weapons (or imitations) and 
him posing  in the apartment 
with various weapons (or 
imitations) including  an AK-47 looking  firearm. He 
also posed with a  handgun and there was a picture 
of a handgun with its serial number scratched off. An 
“AK-47 looking  weapon” was found in the 
apartment and a handgun was found in the trunk of 
a car associated to the accused. In the bedroom 
belonging  to another target of the investigation, 
police seized a significant amount of cash, a  gun 
magazine, magic mushrooms, oxycodone and 
marijuana. In the common areas of the apartment 
police found a digital scale, marijuana, oxycodone 
pills and more packaging. The accused was charged 
with drug and weapons offences.
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Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench
The judge found that a "pure" digital 
camera was not the same as a  cellular 
telephone, which also has the ability to 
take photographs. “It appears that a 
person should not have  an expectation of the same 
level of privacy in a digital camera, given that ... a 
digital camera does not have or retain the 
biographical core  of personal information that they 
maintain on a computer or smartphone,” said the 
judge. “The digital camera retains images, or 
‘documents,’ nothing  more. It is an electronic photo 
album.” The judge found the language of the  warrant 
would include the digital camera and the 
“documents” contained in it. The judge concluded 
there  was no s. 8  Charter breach and, even if there 
was, he would not have excluded the photographs 
under s. 24(2). He noted the uncertainty  in the  law 
at the time as to whether a  police officer executing  a 
search warrant that permits the  seizure and search of 
“electronic devices, and documents relating  to the 
ownership/occupancy”. The police believed on 
reasonable grounds that the search was authorized 
by the warrant. Plus, the officer did not have the 
benefit of Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence 
that has since been issued. The accused was 
convicted on 13 counts related to drug  trafficking 
and weapons offenses.
Alberta Court of Appeal
The accused argued, in part, 
that the examination of the 
camera’s contents by police, 
which occurred while they were 
exercising  a valid search warrant, was an 
unreasonable search and seizure under to s. 8  of the 
Charter. In his view, the examination of the camera 
was not authorized by the warrant and was therefore 
warrantless. Further, he asserted that the evidence of 
the images should have been excluded under s. 
24(2).
The Court of Appeal saw no need to address whether 
the examination of the camera was an unreasonable 
search. Instead, it found that even if there was a s. 8 
Charter breach, the evidence  was admissible under 
s. 24(2). The police were not acting  in bad faith and 
were not negligent in their opinion that they were 
entitled, by operation of law under the warrant, to 
examine the camera and its contents. The police 
were entitled to believe that they were acting  under 
s. 11 of the CDSA. “It should not be forgotten that 
‘police officers have a duty to enforce the law and 
investigate crimes’,” said the  Court of Appeal. It 
continued:
So a police officer cannot just shrug  her 
shoulders and walk away. The officer must 
decide one way or the other what her authority 
allows. While the police must comport 
themselves with integrity and must manifest the 
rule of law by complying with the Charter and 
the law generally, they have to exercise street-
level judgment, often and routinely. ...
This case is not, of course, a case where the 
officer had little time to reflect. But in focusing 
on the degree of alleged departure from warrant 
authority for the purposes of s 24(2) of the 
Charter, it is pertinent to note that the warrant 
here also provided the police officers effecting 
this search with a reasoned basis to believe that 
they had the authority to review the contents of 
the camera, howsoever mistaken. The warrant 
was, indeed, relied on by the police in their 
evidence.  The warrant authorized the search for 
and seizure of: “Cocaine, weigh scales, 
packaging  materials, score sheets, cash, 
electronic communication devices, and 
documents relating  to the ownership / 
occupancy of [specified address]”.
The Crown submits that the warrant provided 
authority to seize the camera itself. No real 
dispute arises on that argument based on what 
the police could reasonably have believed. The 
“[A] police officer cannot just shrug her 
shoulders and walk away. The officer 
must decide one way or the other what 
her authority allows. While the police 
must comport themselves with integrity 
and must manifest the rule of law by 
complying with the Charter and the law 
generally, they have to exercise street-
level judgment, often and routinely.” 
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Crown goes on to contend, however, that the 
camera content on its memory card was a 
“document” for the purposes of this contention. 
Assuming, without deciding, that a photograph 
in a frame depicting the [accused] inside that 
residence with the photo sitting in the open on a 
shelf in the residence, would constitute a 
document, it would then be arguable that such a 
photograph would be a document “relating to 
the ownership/occupancy of” the address.
As for whether the officer could infer that there 
was probably relevant evidence on the camera 
as to their investigation within the meaning of s 
11 of the CDSA (quite apart from whether that 
evidence would have met the warrant definition 
as to occupancy), the reasonableness and 
genuineness of police beliefs based upon the 
grounds in evidence would be assessed on a 
“practical, non-technical, and common sense 
basis” and the totality of the circumstances by a 
court from the shoes of the police officer. 
[references omitted, para. 34-37]
The Court of Appeal went on to agree with the trial 
judge’s s. 24(2) conclusion and upheld the 
admission of the photographs. Although the officer 
agreed at trial that the warrant was not “specifically 
for the camera”, he said that it was his 
understanding  that the search warrant authorized the 
police to “look into that camera”. As the Court of 
Appeal noted, “there is no reason to think that the 
police intentionally opted to step  past the legal 
authority they could have obtained. This was a 
technical mistake at worst even if related to 
authority.” As for the  impact of the accused’s 
Charter-protected interests, it did not warrant 
exclusion. Finally, society’s interest in the 
adjudication of the case on its merits favoured 
inclusion. “Exclusion of the evidence here would 
contradict the truth seeking  function of the 
administration of justice in the context of the 
dangerous combination of drugs and weapons, and 
would be  the consequence of what in the old days 
might have been called the blunder of the 
policeman,” said the Court of Appeal.
The accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
 
3RD ANNUAL 
BRITISH COLUMBIA LAW ENFORCEMENT 
MEMORIAL GOLF TOURNAMENT 
 
Friday, September 23, 2016 
12:00 PM Shotgun Start  
Beach Grove Golf Club in Tsawwassen 
 
Followed by Dinner & Prizes  
 
Texas Scramble Format (4-Person Teams) 
Inter-Agency Competition for  
Peace Officers 
Mail, email or fax your entry forms to:  
Rick Stewart 
BC Law Enforcement Memorial 
c/o Abbotsford Police Department 
2838 Justice Way, Abbotsford, BC V2T 3P5 
 
Fax: 604-859-4812 or email: memorial@abbypd.ca  
 
Entry Fee: $110 – includes green fee & dinner 
w
w
w
.B
C
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M
.ca
BCLEM.CA                 FOLLOW US ON 
BRITISH COLUMBIA LAW ENFORCEMENT MEMORIAL 
In memory of those  
who gave their lives  
in the service of  
British Columbia  
and its citizens
1:00 PM SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 2016
CEREMONY AT BROCKTON OVAL, STANLEY PARK, VANCOUVER, BC
  Law Enforcement participants to form up at HMCS Discovery at 10:30 AM
CONTACTS:  
Sergeant Major James Pearson 
778-837-1537      james.pearson@vpd.ca 
• 
Lorne Pike 
604-690-1744     lpike@deltapolice.ca
HOSTED BY THE VANCOUVER POLICE DEPARTMENT AND DELTA POLICE DEPARTMENT
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2015	POLICE	REPORTED	CRIME
In July 2016  Statistics Canada 
released its “Police-reported 
crime statistics in  Canada, 
2015” report. Highlights of this 
recent collection of crime data 
include:
• There were 1,863,675 crimes (excluding  traffic) 
reported to Canadian police in 2015; this 
represents 70,063 more crimes reported when 
compared to 2014.
• The total crime rate  increased +3%. This includes 
a violent crime rate  rise of +2% and a property 
crime rate rise of +4%.
YK
T-183.6
V-207.7
NV-174.4
T=Total Crime Severity Index
V=Violent Crime Severity Index
NV=Non-Violent Crime Severity Index
SK
T-135.8 
V-134.8
NV-135.9
AB
T-102.3
V-96.5
NV-104.2
BC
T-94.7
V-83.0
NV-98.8
QC
T-55.7
V-65.8
NV-51.9
ON
T-50.6
V-59.2
NV-47.4
MB
T-104.3
V-135.9
NV-92.6
NWT
T-319.0
V-357.7
NV-304.3
NU
T-270.2
V-380.5
NV-229.5
NB
T-63.0
V-60.4
NV-63.8
NF
T-65.6
V-65.2
NV-65.2
NS
T-61.9
V-67.5
NV-59.8
PEI
T-49.7
V-40.8
NV-52.8
Police-Reported Crime Severity Indexes
Police-Reported Impaired Driving Offences
Province Rate Impaired Driving 
Offences
Rate change 
2014 to 2015
SK 575 6,519 -5%
PEI 386 264 -6%
AB 314 13,189 -9%
NS 281 2,653 -7%
NF 261 1,376 -12%
BC 249 11,652 -9%
NB 238 1,795 +5%
MB 217 2,811 0%
QC 184 15,199 0%
ON 111 15,280 0%
The Crime Severity Index (CSI) is another measure of police-reported crime. 
Each offence is assigned a weight, derived from sentences handed down by 
criminal courts. The more serious the average sentence, the higher the offence is 
weighted. The weighted offences are then summed and divided by the population. 
An overall CSI has been created as well as a violent CSI and non-violent CSI.
Source: Statistics Canada, 2016, “Police-reported crime statistics in 
Canada, 2015, Catalogue no. 85-002-X,released on July 20, 2016.
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11,178
+6%
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7,844
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44,316
+1%
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3,387
-3%
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3,547
0%
NF
5,793
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NU
32,495
+4%
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4,141
-12%
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4,933
+10%
NS
4,970
-9%
Police-Reported Crime Rates per 100,000 population
Canada’s Top Ten Reported Crimes
Offence Number
Theft Under $5,000 (non-motor vehicle) 488,540
Mischief 274,829
Administration of Justice Violations 175,341
Break and Enter 159,338
Assault-level 1 156,688
Disturb the Peace 104,129
Fraud (excluding identity fraud) 94,396
Theft of Motor Vehicle 78,849
Impaired Driving 72,039
Uttering Threats 62,845
Homicide
There were 604 homicides reported, 84 more than 
the previous year. Ontario had the most homicides 
at 174, followed by Alberta (133), British Columbia 
(95)  and Quebec  (77). The Yukon and PEI reported 
one (1)  homicide each while Nunavut reported two 
homicides followed by  Newfoundland with three 
(3). As for provincial or territorial homicide rates, the 
Northwest Territories had the highest rate (11.34 per 
100,000 population) followed by  Nunavut (5.42), 
Saskatchewan (3.79), Manitoba  (3.63)  and Alberta 
(3.17). As for Census Metropolitan Areas (CMA’s), 
Regina, SK had the highest homicide rate at 3.30. 
The Canadian homicide rate was 1.68.
Canada
5,198
+3%
Top CMA Homicide Rates per 100,000
CMA Rate CMA Rate
Regina, SK 3.30 Windsor, ON 1.81
Saskatoon, SK 3.22 Kingston, ON 1.80
Winnipeg, MB 2.72 London, ON 1.57
Thunder Bay, ON 2.48 St. Catherines-Niagara, ON 1.56
Saint John, NF 2.36 Guelph, ON 1.53
Halifax, NS 1.91 Barrie, ON 1.41
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Robbery
In 2015 there were 22,080 robberies reported, 
resulting  in a national rate of 62 robberies per 
100,000 population. Manitoba had the highest 
robbery rate followed by Saskatchewan, Alberta and 
British Columbia. 
• Winnipeg, MB had the highest CMA 
rate  for robbery in Canada (178), 
+7% higher than its 2014 rate. Quebec 
City, QC had the lowest rate (15). Thunder 
Bay, ON reported a jump  of 42% in its robbery 
rate. Saint John, NB (+34%), Kingston, ON 
(+31%) and Trois Rivieres, QC (+30%)  also saw 
high double digit rate increases. 
• Six CMAs reported declines in robberies of -10% 
or more: Saguenay, QC, (-30%), Quebec City, 
QC (-28%), Greater Sudbury, ON (-19%), 
Sherbrooke, QC (-17%), St. Catherines-Niagara, 
ON (-16%) and Saskatoon, SK (-10%).
Break and Enter
In 2015 there were 159,338  break-
ins reported to police. The national 
break-in rate was 444 break-ins per 
100,000 people. Nunavut had the 
highest break-in rate (1,633)  followed 
by the Northwest Territories (1,195). 
Police-Reported Robberies
Province/ 
Territory
Rate Robberies Rate change 
2014 to 2015
MB 127 1,642 +6%
SK 86 978 +5%
AB 81 3,404 +23%
BC 78 3,651 +7%
NWT 59 26 +30%
ON 55 7,636 -1%
YK 53 20 -24%
NU 51 19 -2%
QC 49 4,030 -1%
NF 35 186 +17%
NS 34 318 +13%
NB 20 154 +4%
PEI 11 16 -43%
CANADA 62 22,080 +5%
Top Ten CMA Robbery Rates per 100,000
CMA Rate CMA Rate
Winnipeg, MB 178 Toronto, ON 76
Thunder Bay, ON 149 St. John’s, NL 73
Saskatoon, SK 131 Brantford, ON 60
Regina, SK 101 Halifax, NS 59
Montreal, QC 82 Ottawa, ON 58
Police-Reported Break-ins
Province/
Territory
Rate Break-ins Rate change 
2012 to 2013
NU 1,633 603 -2%
NWT 1,195 527 +14%
SK 830 9,407 +9%
YK 802 300 +40%
MB 684 8,842 +17%
AB 656 27,517 +34%
BC 643 30,133 0%
NF 485 2,558 +1%
NB 444 3,346 +19%
QC 395 32,665 -8%
PEI 343 502 +2%
NS 340 3,202 -13%
ON 288 39,736 -1%
CANADA 444 159,338 +4%
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PART	VI	AUTHORIZATION	NOT	
REQUIRED	FOR	HISTORICAL	
TEXT	MESSAGES
R. v. Jones, 2016 ONCA 543
As part of their investigation into the 
possession and trafficking  of firearms, 
the police obtained a  production order 
under s. 487.012 of the Criminal Code 
directed at Telus seeking, among  other 
things, any incoming  or outgoing  text messages on a 
particular account associated with a target. Telus 
provided the historical text messaging  information, 
which included an exchange about the potential sale 
of a handgun between two phones. One phone was 
associated with the target and the other was 
allegedly used by the accused. Both phones, 
however, were listed under other names.
Relying  in part on this text message  exchange, 
police obtained a Criminal Code Part VI wiretap 
authorization for a number of phones associated 
with the suspects. Intercepted communications were 
then used to support an additional Part VI wiretap 
authorization. Search warrants were also granted 
and executed by the police. The searches resulted in 
marijuana trafficking  and proceeds of crime charges 
against the accused. Firearm charges were also laid 
on the basis of the text messages obtained under the 
production order.
Ontario Court of Justice
The accused, along  with the target, 
challenged the production order. He 
contended that if the police wanted to 
obtain information about their text 
messages from service  providers, they needed a  Part 
VI wiretap  authorization, not a production order. The 
accused submitted that his privacy interest in the text 
messages was self-evident while the Crown 
suggested he had no privacy interest in them. 
The judge found the accused had no standing  to 
argue his s. 8 Charter  rights were breached. In her 
view, there was no evidence presented that the 
accused had either a subjective or objective 
reasonable expectat ion of privacy  in the 
circumstances. The judge also 
rejected the contention that the 
police required a Part VI 
authorization for the production 
of the text messages. She was of 
the opinion that a production 
o r d e r w a s t h e p r o p e r 
mechanism to access the cell 
p h o n e r e c o r d s a n d t e x t 
messages. The accused was 
convicted of several firearm and 
drug  trafficking  offences and he 
was sentenced to five years and 
seven months in prison, less time served. 
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused argued, among 
other things, that the  trial judge 
erred in concluding  that he  did 
not have standing  to challenge 
the production order. He also submitted that the 
judge  erred in upholding  the use of a  production 
order to obtain the Telus phone records. 
Standing
In this case, the Court of Appeal found the trial judge 
did not err in concluding  that the  accused had not 
established a  reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the Telus records. He did not testify or lead evidence 
about his subjective  expectation of privacy. Nor was 
the Telus account or phone in his name. He did not 
use this phone, nor was he alleged to have used it. 
Further, there was nothing  to suggest that Telus was 
contractually  bound to the accused to keep any of 
the text messages confidential.
Production Order v. Wiretap Authorization
Although the standing  issue was dispositive of the 
appeal, Justice MacPherson also agreed with the 
judge that a Part VI authorization was not needed to 
obtain historical text messages:
To fall under Part VI, there needs to be a 
prospect ive component to the pr ivate 
communications, otherwise the communications 
are not being  intercepted. This is because the 
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word “intercept” suggests an interference 
between the place of origin and the destination 
of the private communication. There is no such 
interference when obtaining  historical text 
messages stored on a phone or a service 
provider’s server.
... I would not describe the production of 
historical text messages as surveillance or an 
interception. It is, quite simply, a search and 
seizure of a historical record of text messages 
sent and received in the past. [references 
omitted, paras. 30-31]
The Court of Appeal concluded that “a Part VI 
authorization is not required for the search and 
seizure of historical text messages.”
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
NO	PRIVACY	INTEREST	IN	SENT	
TEXT	MESSAGES	ON	RECIPIENT’s	
PHONE
R. v. Marakah, 2016 ONCA 542
Police launched an investigation into 
persons who had legally purchased a 
number of firearms over a short period 
of time. One of these persons, 
Winchester, had legally purchased 45 
firearms over a six-month period. As part of the 
investigation, police received information from a 
confidential informer implicating  the accused. The 
police obtained search warrants for four locations – 
three  associated with Winchester and one associated 
with the accused. When police  executed the 
warrants, they arrested Winchester and seized his 
iPhone. When police entered the accused’s 
residence, he grabbed his Blackberry phone but a 
police officer knocked it out of his hand and arrested 
him. Both phones were forensically  searched and 
were found to contain text messages between the 
accused and Winchester that clearly implicated 
them in gun trafficking.
 Ontario Court of Justice
The accused challenged the search 
warrant at his residence  and the search 
of both his and Winchester’s cell phones. 
The judge found s. 8  breaches in relation 
to the search of the  accused’s residence and his 
cellphone and excluded the evidence obtained from 
those searches under s. 24(2)  of the Charter. As for 
the search of Winchester’s cellphone, the judge 
dismissed the application. He found that the 
accused did not have standing  to argue his s. 8  rights 
were breached in relation to Winchester’s phone. 
Although he accepted that the accused had a 
subjective expectation of privacy in the text 
messages he authored and sent to Winchester, this 
privacy expectation was not objectively reasonable. 
When he sent the  test messages he had no control 
over what would happen to them. 
“I accept that the sender of a text message has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in its contents 
after it has been sent but before it reaches its 
intended destination,” said the judge. “This would 
include text messages stored in a service provider’s 
data base. Once the message reaches its intended 
recipient, however, it is no longer under the control 
of the sender. It is under the complete  control of the 
recipient to do with what he or she wants. In my 
view, there is no longer any reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the sender.” The accused was 
subsequently convicted on two counts of trafficking 
in firearms, conspiracy to traffic  in firearms, 
possession of a loaded restricted firearm, and 
possession of a  firearm without a  valid license. He 
was sentenced to nine years’ imprisonment, less 
credit for pre-trial custody.
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused appealed his 
convictions alleging  that the 
trial judge erred in concluding 
that he had no s. 8  Charter 
standing  to challenge the search of Winchester’s cell 
phone. In his view, his subjective expectation of 
privacy in the text messages was objectively 
reasonable even after the messages were  received by 
Winchester. He sought their exclusion under s. 
24(2). 
“A Part VI authorization is not required 
for the search and seizure of historical 
text messages.”
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Standing
Justice MacPherson, delivering  the majority’s 
decision, summarized the issue of s. 8 Charter 
standing as follows:
Section 8  of the Charter protects the right to be 
secure from unreasonable search and seizure. It 
is framed in a way that attempts to strike a 
balance between important societal interests and 
an individual’s privacy interests.
Like all other Charter rights, s. 8  protects people, 
not places. The right to challenge the legality of 
a search depends upon the accused establishing 
that his personal privacy interests are engaged. 
Section 8  does not protect all privacy interests, 
though. It protects only a reasonable expectation 
of privacy ... 
Accordingly, an accused will only have standing 
to challenge a search or seizure when he or she 
has a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
Standing is not automatic. ...
Further, the decision as to whether an accused 
has a reasonable expectation of privacy must be 
made without reference to the conduct of the 
police during the impugned search. The legality 
or illegality of the police search is irrelevant to 
the determination of standing. The court must 
first determine the threshold question of whether 
the accused has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy. If one is found, the accused then has 
standing to challenge the reasonableness of the 
search and seizure.
It is well-established that to determine whether 
an accused has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy, courts must take a contextual approach 
and consider the totality of the circumstances.
This is true whether it is a personal, territorial or 
informational privacy interest at stake. The 
“totality of the circumstances” test is one of 
substance, not of form. references omitted, 
paras. 26-32]
In this case, the majority concluded that the accused 
had no standing  to bring  a s. 8  challenge concerning 
the search of Winchester’s cell phone. The accused 
had no ownership in or control over Winchester’s 
phone and there  was no obligation of confidentiality 
between the two. Nor did the subject matter of the 
communica t ions touch on the accused’s 
biographical core nor was it of an intimate nature:
The facts of this case demonstrate that ... the 
ability to control access to the information is of 
central importance to the assessment of the 
privacy claim. We are not talking about the 
[accused’s] privacy interest in the contents of his 
own phone, or even the contents of a phone 
belonging  to someone else, but which he 
occasionally used. We are also not dealing with 
deeply personal, intimate details going  to the 
[accused’s] biographical core. Here, we are 
talking about text messages on someone else’s 
phone that reveal no more than what the 
messages contained – discussions regarding the 
trafficking of firearms.
This is far from being a question of whether the 
[accused] had “exclusive control” over the 
content. He had no ability to regulate access and 
no control over what Winchester (or anyone) did 
with the contents of Winchester’s phone. The 
[accused’s] request to Winchester that he delete 
the messages is some indication of his awareness 
of this fact. Further, his choice over his method 
of communication created a permanent record 
over which Winchester exercised control.
It has never been the case that privacy rights are 
absolute. Not everything we wish to keep 
confidential is protected under s. 8  of the 
Charter. In my view, the manner in which one 
elects to communicate must affect the degree of 
privacy protection one can reasonably expect.
“Like all other Charter rights, s. 8 protects 
people, not places. The right to challenge 
the legality of a search depends upon the 
accused establishing that his personal 
privacy interests are engaged.”
“[A]n accused will only have standing to 
challenge a search or seizure when he or 
she has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy. Standing is not automatic.”
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In this case, the application judge properly 
focused on the factors of control, access and 
lack of confidentiality. [paras. 63-66]
And further:
In most cases – but not all – ... a sender controls 
the content and recipient of a message. 
However, once the message is received, the 
recipient becomes the controller and the 
sender’s privacy interest will generally disappear. 
[para. 78]
Since the accused lacked standing  to argue a s. 8 
breach, there  was no need to address s. 24(2). The 
accused’s appeal was dismissed and his convictions 
upheld.
A Second View
Justice LaForme, in dissent, concluded 
that the accused did have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy to challenge the 
search of Winchester’s phone:
We are required to consider whether people in 
the [accused’s] situation can generally maintain 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in text 
messages sent to another person. The nature of 
the information that such communications might 
reveal and the nature of interests implicated 
support the [accused’s] position. The absence of 
control does not negate a reasonable 
expectation of privacy and any reliance on the 
absence of control reintroduces the discredited 
risk analysis. Relevant normative considerations 
suggest that people should be able to maintain a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in text 
messages generally. The [accused’s] position is 
the practically preferable option. As such, in my 
view, the application judge erred in concluding 
that the [accused] had no standing  to bring a s. 8 
Charter challenge in connection with the search 
of Winchester’s cell phone.  [para. 184]
In Justice LaForme’s view, the search was 
unreasonable, it breached s. 8  and the evidence 
should have  been excluded under s. 24(2). He 
would have allowed the appeal, excluded the  text 
messages and entered acquittals on all charges. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
Editor’s note: The majority of the  Ontario Court of 
Appeal in R. v. Marakah, 2016  ONCA 542 disagreed 
with the recent British Columbia Court of Appeal 
majority decision in R. v. Pelucco, 2015 BCCA 370. 
The majority in Pelucco found that an accused had 
standing  to challenge the search and seizure of 
electronic messages on someone else’s electronic 
device  because a sender will ordinarily have a 
reasonable expectation that a  text message will 
remain private in the hands of its recipient. As Justice 
MacPherson in Pelucco stated:
There is, in my view, a lack of empirical 
evidence to support a conclusion that senders of 
text messages have a presumptively reasonable 
expectation, from an objective standpoint, that 
their text messages will remain private in the 
hands of the recipient. In fact, there are many 
examples of behaviour in text messaging  (and in 
other forms of communication) that suggest that 
senders are alive to the fact that their 
communications may no longer be private once 
sent or made. [para. 71]
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